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OBSCENITY LAW:
APRES STANLEY, LE DELUGE?*
The status of obscenity under our Constitution is a controversial
subject which is constantly before federal and state courts because the
United States Supreme Court has failed to establish adequate guidelines
for courts to follow in determining whether obscene matter is constitutionally protected in various sets of circumstances. The Supreme Court
eventually must "reconcile the right of the Nation and of the States to
maintain a decent society and, on the other hand, the right of individuals
to express themselves freely in accordance with the guarantees of the
First and Fourteenth Amendments." ' The Court held, in Stanley v.
Georgia,2 that "mere private possession" of obscene matter was protected under the first and fourteenth amendments,3 and thereby extended
constitutional protection to obscenity for the first time. The scope of this
recently announced protection must be clearly delineated, for courts
throughout the nation have diversely interpreted the implications of the
4
Stanley decision.
This article hopefully will perform three functions: (1) summarization and analysis of the Stanley opinion; (2) presentation of the diverse
constructions of Stanley; and (3) prediction of the scope of constitutional protection that will be afforded to obscene matter. First, the constitutional status of obscenity prior to Stanley is briefly described; second,
the Stanley decision is summarized in detail and analyzed in depth; third,
the interpretations of Stanley in subsequent decisions are collected and
contrasted; fourth, the assertion that obscenity induces criminal conduct
as a basis for upholding legislation prohibiting its distribution in all
circumstances is carefully considered; finally, predictions are made as to

* This article is a student work prepared by Michael J. Gaynor, a member of the
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW and the St. Thomas More Institute for Legal Research.
1 Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 199 (1964) (Warren, C.J., dissenting).
2 394 U.S. 557 (1969).
3 Id. at 568.
4

See text accompanying notes 74-132 infra.
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what view the Court will take when it determines the constitutionality of absolute

bans on the public dissemination of obscene
material.
Background: From Roth to Stanley

Obscenity law involves two basic issues:
what is obscene and to what extent may it

be regulated. The Supreme Court, which
had approved a federal obscenity statute in
1878,5 first answered these questions in
1957, in Roth v. United States and Alberts
0
v. California.
Therein, the Court maintained that "[a]ll ideas having even the
slightest redeeming social importance . . .
even ideas hateful to the prevailing climate

of opinion," were entitled to full constitutional protection, being subject to regula-

tion only when they encroached upon the
few "more important interests."'7 Obscenity,
however, was defined as matter in which
the dominant theme appeals to the prurient interest of the average person when
interpreted in its entirety by contemporary
community standards, 8 and rejected

as

5 Ex parte Jackson, 96 U.S. 727, 737 (1878).

6 354 U. S. 476 (1957). In Roth, the constitutionality of 18 U.S.C. § 1461, which makes obscene
matter nonmailable, was at issue; in Alberts, the
issue was the validity of Cal. Penal Code § 311
(West 1955), which proscribed distribution of
obscene material. Id. at 479.
7 Id. at 484. See, e.g., Kingsley Int'l Pictures
Corp. v. Regents, 360 U.S. 684 (1959), wherein
the Court unanimously held unconstitutional New
York's refusal to license a motion picture (Lady
Chatterley's Lover) on the ground that it depicted adultery favorably. Id. at 687-88.
8 Id. at 489. It should be remembered that this
test was a substantial liberalization of the Hicklin rule, under which a publication would be held
obscene if it tended "to deprave and corrupt
those whose minds are open to such immoral
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wholly lacking redeeming social value. 9
The "dispositive question" was "whether
obscenity is utterance within the area of
protected speech and press."' 10 The argument that obscenity laws are unconstitutional because they punish incitement to
thoughts without requiring proof that those
thoughts induce prohibitable action was
deftly circumvented: 1' quoting from Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire 2 and Beauharnais v. Illinois,13 the Court held,
apparently without qualification, that obscenity is not constitutionally protected
expression, because it wholly lacks re-

influences, and into whose hands a publication
of this sort may fall." Regina v. Hicklin, L.R.
3 Q.B. 360, 371 (1868).
9 354 U.S. at 484-85.
10 Id. at 481.
11 354 U.S. at 485-86. See Kalven, The Metaphysics of the Law of Obscenity, 1960 Sup. CT.
REV. 1.

12 "There are certain well-defined and narrowly
limited classes of speech, the prevention and
punishment of which has never been thought to
raise any Constitutional problem. These include
the lewd and obscene....
It has been well observed that such utterances are no essential
part of any exposition of ideas, and are of such
slight social value as a step to truth that any
benefit that may be derived from them is
clearly outweighed by the social interest in
order and morality."
Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568,
571-72 (1942), quoted in 354 U.S. at 485 (emphasis added).
13 "Libelous utterances not being within the area
of constitutionally protected speech, it is unnecessary, either for us or for the State courts,
to consider the issues behind the phrase 'clear
and present danger.' Certainly no one would
contend that obscene speech, for example, may
be punished only upon a showing of such circumstances. Libel, as we have seen, is in the

same class."
Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, 266 (1952),
quoted in 354 U.S. at 486-87.
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deeming social value, 14 and, therefore,

it must be established that (a) the dominant

need not be regulated under the "clear and
present danger"15 or "balancing"' 1 tests.
The Court had fashioned a definitional or

theme of the material taken as a whole ap-

peals to a prurient interest in sex; (b) the
material is patently offensive because it
affronts contemporary community standards
relating to the description or representation
of sexual matters; and (c) the material is
20
utterly without redeeming social value.

per se test: when material was challenged,
the determination to be made was whether
that material satisfied the elements of ob-

scenity, not whether it jeopardized a valid
17
community interest. '

The Court explained in detail and modi-

fied its views on obscenity before the
Stanley decision was handed down in 1969.
The definition of obscenity has been nar-

rowed by the addition of requirements that
the matter be patently offensive' s and
wholly lacking in redeeming social importance.' 9 For matter to be held obscene per
se now,
"[I]mplicit in the history of the First Amendment is the rejection of obscenity as utterly without redeeming social importance." 354 U.S. at
484.
15 Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52
(1919): "The question in every case is whether
the words used are used in such circumstances
and are of such a nature as to create a clear and
present danger that they will bring about the
substantive evils that Congress has a right to
prevent."
10 " 'In each case [the court] must ask whether
the gravity of the "evil," discounted by its improbability, justifies such invasion of free speech
as is necessary to avoid the danger.'" Dennis v.
United States, 341 U.S. 494, 510 (1951), quoting United States v. Dennis, 183 F.2d 201, 212
(2d Cir. 1950), aft'd, 341 U.S. 494 (1951).
17 "There are two categories of speech-that
entitled to first amendment scrutiny, although
after such scrutiny it may prove subject to regulation; and that so without importance or ideas
that it is virtually per se subject to regulation
and raises no constitutional issues." H. KALVEN,
14

THE

NEGRO

AND

THE

FRST

AMENDMENT
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(1965); see Kalven, supra note 11.
1 Manual Enterprises, Inc. v. Day, 370 U.S.
478, 482 (1962).
19 Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 191 (1964).

The phrase "contemporary community
standards" had been held to require that
21
matter be judged by a national standard.
Decisions subsequent to Roth have extended the applicability of the obscenity
classification in special circumstances that
do not necessarily strictly satisfy the requirements of the aforementioned definition. In Mishkin v. New York,22 the Court
held that the prurient interest of a specific
sexually deviant group toward which matter
is primarily directed may be substituted for
that of the general public in determining
whether that matter meets the prurientappeal requirement. 23 Similarly, in Ginzburg v. United States,24 the Court held that
material not otherwise "obscene" could
lose its constitutional protection if pandered, i.e., presented in a manner designed
to appeal to erotic interest. 25 Moreover, the

A Book Named "John Cleland's Memoirs of
a Woman of Pleasure" v. Attorney Gen. of
Mass., 383 U.S. 413, 418 (1966).
21 Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 195 (1964):
"It is, after all, a national Constitution we are
expounding."
22 383 U.S. 502 (1966).
23 Id. at 508.
24 383 U.S. 463 (1966).
25 "[Iun close cases evidence of pandering may
be probative with respect to the nature of the
20

material in question and thus satisfy the Roth

test." Id. at 474 Ginzburg had marketed in a
manner prompting the reader to look "for titillation, not for saving intellectual content." Id.

17
26
Court held, in Ginsberg v. New York,
that a state may impose a more restrictive
standard concerning the matter minors may
read and view.2 7 The attitude of the Court
is best illustrated by the Redrup v. New
York decision, 28 wherein the matter in
question was held not to be obscene per
se2 9 and no special circumstances were involved. 30 The two-level theory of speech
presented in Roth, under which the determination of obscenity was wholly definitional, was modified; otherwise nonobscene
matter could now be encompassed within
the broadened category of nonspeech if
pandered, inflicted upon the unwilling, or

at 470. The Court decided that, under the circumstances, he was estopped to deny that his

product was advertised accurately.
26 390 U.S. 629 (1968).
27 Id. at 636-37.
28 386 U.S. 767 (1967)
(per curiam); see
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provided for juveniles. This expanded
proach, variously labelled "obscenity
quod," 31 "contextual obscenity, 8' 2
"variable obscenity," 3. made context
basis for determining whether material
obscene per se would be classified as
34
protected expression.

apper
and
the
not
un-

The Court also reconsidered its conclusion that obscenity is wholly unprotected.
Constitutional barriers to some exercises of
a state's power to prevent distribution of
obscene material were recognized in Smith
v. California,35 wherein scienter was held to
be an essential element in any bookseller's
conviction for possession of obscene matter. 36 This attitude was reiterated in New
York Times Co. v. Sullivan,37 in the
Court's statement that "obscenity . . . can
claim no talismanic immunity from consti-

Teeter & Pember, The Retreat from Obscenity:

Redrup v. New York, 21

HASTINGS

L.J. 175

(1969).
29 Id. at 771.
"Redrup is authority only for the proposition
that the particular books and magazines there
involved were not obscene. We think that if
the Redrup decision was intended to reverse
the Roth-Memoirs test, that obscenity is not
constitutionally-protected speech, the court
would have so stated in no uncertain terms."
State v. Amato, 183 N.W.2d 29, 32 (Wis. 1971);
accord, Milkway Prods., Inc. v. Leary, 305 F.
Supp. 288, 294 (S.D.N.Y. 1969), a'd sub nom.
New York Feed Co., Inc. v. Leary, 397 U.S. 98
(1970) (per curiam).
30 "In none of these cases was there a claim that
the statute in question reflected a specific and
limited state concern for juveniles. . . . In none
was there any suggestion of an assault upon
individual privacy by publication in a manner so
obtrusive as to make it impossible for an unwilling individual to avoid exposure to it.... And in
none was there evidence of the sort of "pandering" which the Court found significant in Ginzburg v. United States.
Id. at 769 (citations
omitted).

31 E.g., Monaghan, Obscenity, 1966: The Marriage of Obscenity Per Se and Obscenity Per
Quod, 76 YALE L.J. 127 (1966).
32 E.g., Semonche, Definitional and Contextual
Obscenity: The Supreme Court's New and Disturbing Accommodation, 13 U.C.L.A.L. REV.
1173 (1966).
33 E.g., Lockhart & McClure, Censorship of Obscenity: The Developing Constitutional Standards, 45 MINN. L. REV. 5, 68 et seq. (1960).
34 See generally Gerber, A Suggested Solution to
the Riddle of Obscenity, 112 U. PA. L. REV. 834
(1964); Lockhart & McClure, Obscenity Censorship: The Core Constitutional Issue-What Is
Obscene?, 7 UTAH L. REV. 289, 298 (1961);
Magrath, The Obscenity Cases: Grapes of Roth,
1966 SuP. CT. REV. 7; Morreale, Obscenity: An
Analysis and Statutory Proposal, 1969 Wis. L.
REV. 421, 455-56; Slough & McAnany, Obscenity and Constitutional Freedom, 8 ST. Louis
U.L.J. 279, 449 (1964).
35 361 U.S. 147 (1959).
36 Id. at 154. However, the Court again stated
that obscene expression is not -constitutionally
protected. Id. at 152.
37 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
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tutional limitations" and "must be measured by standards that satisfy the First
Amendment. ' 38 In 1966, however, the
Court restated the Roth view that obscenity is "inconsistent with any claim to the
shelter of the First Amendment. '3 9 Two
40
years later, in Ginsberg v. New York,
this view of obscenity as unprotected expression, suppressible without regard to
the "clear and present danger" test, was
reaffirmed. 41 It is in this light that Stanley
v. Georgia, the landmark obscenity case of
1969, must be interpreted.

Stanley v. Georgia: Private Possession

of Obscene Matter Is Lawful
The operative facts in the Stanley case
are simple: federal and state agents found
three reels of film, assumed to be obscene ,42
in Robert Eli Stanley's bedroom during an
authorized search for bookmaking material. 43 Stanley was convicted of knowingly
possessing obscene matter in violation of
Georgia law. 44 The Supreme Court of

Id. at 269; see Kalven, The New York Times
Case: A Note on "The Central Meaning of the
First Amendment," 1964 Sup. CT. REV. 191, 201,
217-18 (inferring a breakdown in the two-level
theory of speech).
39 Ginzburg v. United States, 383 U.S. 463, 475
(1966) (emphasis added).
40 390 U.S. 629 (1968).
38

41

Id. at 641.

42

394 U.S. at 559 n.2.

43 Id. at 558.

Ga. Code Ann. § 26-6301 (Supp. 1968), providing in pertinent part:
Any person who shall . . . knowingly have
possession of ... any obscene matter ... shall,
if such person has knowledge or reasonably
should know of the obscene nature of such
matter, be guilty of a felony, and, upon con44

Georgia affirmed his conviction, 45 holding
that the state need not prove "intent to
sell, expose or circulate the same" under
an indictment charging possession of obscene matter.4 6
The United States Supreme Court, distinguishing public distribution of obscene
matter from its private possession, 47 applied the "balancing" test4 8 and held for
the first time49 that the state's "broad

viction thereof, shall be punished by confinement in the penitentiary for not less than one
year nor more than five years....
45 Stanley v. State, 224 Ga. 259, 161 S.E.2d 309
(1968), rev'd sub nor. Stanley v. Georgia, 394
U.S. 557 (1969).
46 Id. at 261, 161 S.E.2d at 311.
47 394 U.S. at 560-61:
None of the statements cited by the Court in
Roth for the proposition that "this Court has
always assumed that obscenity is not protected by the freedoms of speech and press"
were made in the context of a statute punishing mere private possession of obscene material; the cases cited deal for the most part
with use of the mails to distribute objectionable material or with some form of public distribution or dissemination. Moreover, none
of this Court's decisions subsequent to Roth
involved prosecution for private possession
of obscene materials. Those cases dealt with
the power of the State and Federal Governments to prohibit or regulate certain public
actions taken or intended to be taken with respect to obscene matter.
48 Id. at 564-68.
49 The issue of whether mere knowing possession
of obscene matter can be prohibited constitutionally was before the Court in Mapp v. Ohio,
376 U.S. 643 (1961), but that case was decided
on another ground. In Stanley, Justices Stewart,
Brennan, and White concurred in the result, but
would have reversed Stanley's conviction, under
the Mapp rule, on the basis of a fourth amendment infringement. Id. at 569 (concurring opinion). In Mapp, Justice Stewart voted to reverse
on the ground that the applicable statute, which

17
power to regulate obscenity .. .does not
extend to mere possession by the individual
in the privacy of his own home."5 0 The
Roth doctrine's apparently absolute exclusion of obscenity from constitutional protection was clearly rejected, for the holding
of the majority was based on the first and
fourteenth amendments. 51 The Court's assertion that Roth and its progeny are not
impaired by the Stanley decision5 2 must be
interpreted in light of Stanley's prior limitation of them to recognition of a legitimate
governmental interest in the regulation of
commercial distribution of obscene matter. 53 The Roth view-that proof of a
"clear and present danger" of antisocial
behavior emanating from exposure to obscene matter is unnecessary for regulation
of obscenity-was apparently limited to
its public dissemination, in which "there is
always the danger that obscene material
might fall into the hands of children .. .
or . . .intrude upon the sensibilities or
privacy of the general public. '54 But an
important question was not expressly
answered: when the aforementioned dangers are eliminated, is dissemination then
permitted?
Each of Georgia's attempted justifications of the proscription of mere private
possession of obscene matter was succinctly dismissed. First, Georgia contended

made mere possession of obscene matter unlaw-

ful, was "not 'consistent with the rights of free
thought and expression assured against state
action by the Fourteenth Amendment.'" 367
U.S. at 672 (Stewart, J., concurring).
50 394 U.S. at 568.
51 Id.
52 Id. at

567.

53 Id. at 563-64.
54 Id. at 567 (emphasis added).
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that the Roth case, wherein it was held
that "obscenity is not within the area of
constitutionally
protected
speech
or
press," 55 allowed prohibition of mere private possession.5" The Court replied:
[W]e do not believe that this case can be decided simply by citing Roth. Roth and its
progeny certainly do mean that the First
and Fourteenth Amendments recognize a
valid governmental interest in dealing with
the problem of obscenity. But the assertion
of that interest cannot, in every context, be
insulated from all constitutional protections. Neither Roth nor any other decision
of this Court reaches that far. . . . [Citing
Roth] cannot foreclose an examination of
the constitutional implications of a statute
forbidding mere private possession of such
57
material.
The magic word had failed to carry the
day; the Court would weigh the constitutional rights sought to be denied against
the interests of Georgia in denying them to
determine the validity of the conviction.
The Court next described the constitutional rights involved in this case. These
fundamental rights were the right to receive
information and ideas, without regard to
social worth, 58 and "the right to be free,
except in very limited circumstances, from
unwanted governmental intrusions into

55 354 U.S. at 485.
56 394 U.S. at 560.
57 Id. at 563-64.
58 Id. at 564, citing Winters v. New York, 333
U.S. 507, 510 (1948). Therein, the Court stated:
"We do not accede to appellee's suggestion that
the constitutional protection for a free press applies only to the exposition of ideas. . . . They
are equally subject to control if they are lewd,
indecent, obscene or profane."
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one's privacy."59 The latter right brought
"an added dimension" to the former one. 60

Georgia maintained that it was empowered

Stanley was

zenry from the corrupting influence of obscenity; to that the Court replied:

to safeguard the moral purity of its citi-

asserting the right to read or observe what
he pleases-the right to satisfy his intellectual and emotional needs in the privacy of
his own home. . . . the right to be free
from state inquiry into the contents of his
library, 61
and the Court was most sympathetic to his

cause:
Whatever may be the justifications for other
statutes regulating obscenity, we do not
think they reach into the privacy of one's
own home. If the First Amendment means
anything, it means that a State has no business telling a man, sitting alone in his own
house, what books he may read or what
films he may watch. Our whole constitutional heritage rebels at the thought of
giving government the power to control
62
men's minds.
Against these powerful personal liber-

ties Georgia raised three arguments. First,

59 The makers of our Constitution undertook to
secure conditions favorable to the pursuit of
happiness. They recognized the significance of
man's spiritual nature, of his feelings and of
his intellect. They knew that only a part of
the pain, pleasure and satisfaction of life are
to be found in material things. They sought
to protect Americans in their beliefs, their
thoughts, their emotions and their sensations.
They conferred, as against the Government,
the right to be let alone-the most comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by
civilized man.
Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478
(1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting), quoted in 394
U.S. at 564.
60 Id.
61 Id. at 565.
62 Id. (emphasis added).

Whatever the power of the state to control
public dissemination of ideas inimical to
the public morality, it cannot constitutionally premise legislation on the desirability
of controlling a person's private thoughts.6 3
The argument that obscene matter is devoid of ideological content was deemed irrelevant, for the Court was unwilling
and/or unable to distinguish "transmission
of ideas" from "mere entertainment.

' 64

No

form of obscenity regulation could be justified under this argument, unless it was
limited to protection of children.6 5
Next, Georgia contended that the statute
in question was valid because obscene
matter may prompt deviant sexual behavior, including criminal conduct. 66 The
Court noted that the theory that exposure
to such material causes antisocial conduct
had not been proven, 67 and then asserted
that even irrefutable evidence of a causal
relationship would not justify prohibition

63

Id. at 566.

Id., citing Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507,
510, (1948).
65 Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 636-37
(1968).
66 394 U.S. at 566.
64

67

Id.

Given the present state of knowledge, the State
may no more prohibit mere possession of obscene matter on the ground that it may lead to
antisocial conduct than it may prohibit possession of chemistry books on the ground that
they may lead to the manufacture of homemade spirits.
Id. at 567.

17
of mere private possession."
stated that

The Court

in the context of private consumption of

ideas and information we should adhere to
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are not impaired by today's holding. As we
have said, the States retain broad power to
regulate obscenity; that power simply does
not extend to mere possession by the indi72
vidual in the privacy of his own home.

the view that '[a]mong free men, the deter-

rents ordinarily to be applied to prevent

crime are education and punishment for
violations of the law ....
The "clear and present danger" test remained unnecessary only in cases dealing
with public distribution of obscene
70
matter.
Finally, Georgia alleged that prohibition
of possession of obscene matter is an indispensable element in statutory schemes prohibiting its public distribution. The Court
did not believe that the difficulty of proving
intent to distribute was especially great.
It decided that any interest in such proscription as a necessary incident to prohibition of distribution is outweighed by
the fundamental right that would be re71
stricted.
Each argument being rejected, the Court
summarized the status of obscenity as protected expression:
We hold that the First and Fourteenth
Amendments prohibit making mere private
possession of obscene material a crime.
Roth and the cases following that decision

Id. at 566.
Id. at 566-67, quoting Whitney v. California,
274 U.S. 357, 378 (1927) (Brandeis, J. concur68

69

ring) and citing Emerson, Toward a General
Theory of the First Amendment, 72 YALE L.J.

877, 938 (1963).
70 Id. at 567.
71 Id. at 567-68. The Court cited Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147 (1959). See text accompanying notes 35-36 supra.

It is understandable that the Stanley
decision has provoked extensive discussion. 73 The Court rejected Roth's two-level
theory of speech in the context of private
possession of obscene matter, but did not

72 394 U.S. at 568.
73 Eich, From Ulysses to Portnoy: a Pornography
Primer, 53 MARQ. L. REV. 155 (1970); Engdahl,
Requiem for Roth: Obscenity Doctrine Is Changing, 68 MICH. L. REV. 185 (1969); Gegan,
The Twilight of Nonspeech, 15 CATHOLIC LAW.
210 (1969); Karre, New Directions in Obscenity
Regulation?, 48 TEXAS L. REV. 646 (1970); Katz,
Privacy and Pornography: Stanley v. Georgia,
1969 SuP. CT. REV. 203; Ratner, The Social Importance of Prurient Interest-Obscenity Regulation v. Thought-Privacy, 42 So. CALIF. L.
REV. 587 (1969); Tucker, The Law of Obscenity
-Where Has It Gone?, 22 U. FLA. L. REV. 547
(1970); Warren, Jr., Obscenity Laws-A Shift
to Reality?, 11 SANTA CLARA LAW. 1 (1970);
Comment, Private Morality and the Right to
Be Free: The Thrust of Stanley v. Georgia, 11
ARIz. L. REV. 731 (1969); Note, Stanley v.
Georgia: A Private Look at Obscenity, 21 BAYLOR L. REV. 503 (1969); Note, The New Metaphysics of the Law of Obscenity, 57 CALIF. L.
REV. 1257 (1969); The Supreme Court, 1968
Term, 83 HARV. L. REV. 7, 147-54 (1969); Note,
Stanley v. Georgia: A FirstA mendment Approach
to Obscenity Control, 31 OHIO S.L.J. 364 (1970);
Comment, Obscenity: The Pig in the Parlor,
10 SANTA CLARA LAW. 288 (1970); Note, Obscenity from Stanley to Karalexis: A Back Door
Approach to First Amendment Protection, 23
VAND. L. REV. 369 (1970); Recent Decision, 34
ALBANY L. REV. 708 (1970); Casenote, 49 NEB.
L. REV. 660 (1970); Recent Case, 7 SAN DIEGO
L. REV. 111 (1970); Recent Decision, 43 TEMP.
L.Q. 89 (1969); Note, TULSA L.J. 277 (1970);
Case Comment, 22 U. FLA. L. REV. 138 (1969);
Current Decision, 11 WM. & MARY L. REV. 261
(1969).
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explicitly modify the status of its dissemination to permit controlled distribution. A
possible result is an anomalous situation in
which the individual can legally possess
what may not be legitimately distributed;
theoretically, a state can negate the individual's right to indulge in obscenity in his
home by prohibiting sales and effectively
enforcing such a prohibition. Just as the
rights of production and of distribution
are useless without corresponding rights of
reception and of possession, the latter rights
are impotent without the former ones. The
Court must perform two important tasks:
(1) delineate protected possession from
unprotected distribution, and (2) determine whether the right to possess obscene
matter implies a correlative right to supply.
Subsequent Decisions: Contradictory
Interpretations
The impact of the Stanley case on obscenity law has been interpreted very differently by various courts. Most courts have
strictly construed the holding in Stanley,
but others have invoked the case to invalidate the application of statutes proscribing distribution and to protect an
obscene film unobtrusively offered only to
forewarned adults at a public theater.
These contradictory readings of the same
opinion illustrate the pressing need for
clarification.
Professor Gegan eloquently summarized
the thinking of the strict constructionist:
[Stanley] does not acknowledge a "right" to
undergo pornographic experiences in private any more than the statute of frauds
grants a "right" to breach oral contracts.
The law tolerates both because of uniquely
remedial considerations. The cure would

be worse than the disease. The recognition
of this does not mean that society either
values the disease or considers it with indifference. Should the repellent activity surface in circumstances not relevant to privacy the law wilt step in. The privilege
recognized in Stanley is, in short, a shield
for the private citizen, not a sword for the
74
purveyor.
Numerous courts subscribe to this philosophy and refuse to legitimatize obscenity
further. 7 5

74 Gegan, supra note 73, at 218-19.

Miller v. United States, 431 F.2d 655, 657 (9th
Cir. 1970); United States v. Orito, 424 F.2d
276 (9th Cir. 1970); United States v. Fragus,
422 F.2d 1244, 1245 (5th Cir.), supplemented,
75

428 F.2d 1211, 1213 (1970) (per curiam);
United States v. Melvin, 419 F.2d 136, 138-39

(4th Cir. 1969); Academy, Inc. v. Vance, 320
F. Supp. 1357 (S.D. Tex. 1970) (three-iudge
court) (one judge dissenting); United States v.
Thevis, 320 F. Supp. 713, 715 (N.D. Ga. 1970);
United States v. Gower, 316 F. Supp. 1390, 1394
(D.D.C. 1970); ABC Books, Inc. v. Benson,
315 F. Supp. 695, 701-02 (M.D. Tex. 1970)
(three-judge court); Newman v. Conover, 313
F. Supp. 623, 625-26 (N.D. Tex. 1970) (threejudge court); United States v. Rubin, 312 F.
Supp. 950 (C.D. Cal. 1970); Grove Press, Inc.
v. Brockett, 312 F. Supp. 496, 497 (E.D. Wash.
1970); United States v. Pryba, 312 F. Supp. 466
(D.D.C. 1970); United States v. Ten Erotic
Paintings, 311 F. Supp. 884, 886 (D. Md. 1970);
Palladino v. McBrine, 310 F. Supp. 308, 310
(D. Mass. 1970); Gable v. Jenkins, 309 F. Supp.
998, 1000 (N.D. Ga. 1969) (three-judge court),
afl'd, 397 U.S. 592 (1970) (per curiam); May v.
Harper, 306 F. Supp. 1222, 1224 (N.D. Fla.
1969); Grove Press, Inc. v. Evans, 306 F. Supp.
1084, 1087 (E.D. Va. 1969); Bazzell v. Gibbens,
306 F. Supp. 1057 (E.D. La. 1969); Copland v.
O'Connor, 306 F. Supp. 375 (N.D. Cal. 1969);
Overstock Book Co. v. Barry, 305 F. Supp. 842,
851 (E.D.N.Y. 1969); Raphael v. Hogan, 305
F. Supp. 749, 753, 755 n.19 (S.D.N.Y. 1969);
Henley v. Wise, 303 F. Supp. 62, 66-69 (N.D.
Ind. 1969) (three-judge court); Great Speckled
Bird of Atlanta Cooperative News Project v.

17
Only a few of the cases decided by the
aforementioned courts need be discussed
to convey adequately the attitude of those
courts and to present examples of the various sets of circumstances in which the Stanley case was invoked unsuccessfully. In
State v. Reese,76 a Florida court limited
the scope of Stanley's protection of private
possession of obscene matter to the home
and declined to strike down a statute encompassing prohibition of possession of
obscene matter. 77 Three-judge district
courts upheld statutes outlawing dissemination of obscene matter against challenges
7s
based on Stanley in Newman v. Conover
and ABC Books, Inc. v. Benson. 79 In
Raphael v. Hogan, 0 a district court decided that Stanley did not protect those
who presented an obscene play to an adult
81
audience. In United States v. Melvin,
2
United States v. Fragus, and United States
v. Orito,8 3 the Fourth, Fifth, and Ninth
Circuits, respectively, found Stanley no
obstacle in upholding the constitutionality
of the federal statute which prohibits

Stynchcombe, 298 F. Supp. 1291, 1293 (N.D.
Ga. 1969) (three-judge court) (per curiam);
People v. Luros, 480 P.2d 633, 638-39, 92 Cal.
Rptr. 833,

838-39

(1971)

(three judges dis-

senting); Gornto v. Stohe, 178 S.E.2d
(Ga. 1970); State v. Burgin, 178 S.E.2d
(S.C. 1970); State v. Scott, 460 S.W.2d
(Tex. 1970); State v. Reese, 222 So.2d

894,
325,
103,
732,

896
329
111
736

(Fla. 1969).
76
77

222 So. 2d 732 (Fla. 1969).
Id. at 736.

313 F. Supp. 623, 625-26 (N.D. Tex. 1970).
79 315 F. Supp. 695, 701-02 (M.D. Tex. 1970)
78

(three-judge court); accord, United States v.
Gower, 316 F. Supp. 1390, 1394 (D.D.C. 1970).
80 305 F. Supp. 749, 753 (S.D.N.Y. 1969).
81 419 F.2d 136, 139 (4th Cir. 1969).
82 422 F.2d 1244, 1245 (5th Cir.) supplemented,
428 F.2d 1211, 1213 (1970) (per curiam).
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knowingly using any common carrier for
the transportation in interstate commerce
of obscene matter.8 4 Similarly, in United
States v. Ten Erotic Paintings,5 a district
court upheld Congress' power to proscribe
importation of obscene matter against an
attack based upon the Stanley case. 6 Each
of these cases reflects a desire to limit the
constitutional protection afforded obscene
matter to its mere private possession, and
a most unsympathetic attitude toward those
who claim that Stanley's rights to receive
and to possess imply a corresponding right
with them to distribute.
The Supreme Court recently indicated,
perhaps, that the Stanley decision should
s7
be strictly construed. In Gable v. Jenkins,
wherein the constitutionality of a Georgia
statute prohibiting dissemination of obscene material to any person was at issue,
a three-judge court read Stanley as "limited to its facts." 88 Noting that possible
exceptions, e.g., a husband showing material to his wife, were not present, the court
held that the phrase any person did not
make the statute constitutionally overbroad.8 9 The Supreme Court affirmed without opinion,90 and some courts have
interpreted its action as approval of the
91
lower court's construction of Stanley.

83 424 F.2d 276 (9th Cir. 1970); accord, United
States v. Pryba, 312 F. Supp. 466 (D.D.C. 1970).
84 18 U.S.C. § 1462 (1964).
85 311 F. Supp. 884 (D. Md. 1970).
86 Id. at 886.
87 309 F. Supp. 998 (N.D. Ga. 1969) (three-

judge court), afj'd, 397 U.S. 592 (1970)
curiam).

(per

88 Id. at 1000.
8) Id. at 1000-01.

90 397 U.S. 592 (1970) (per curiam).
M' Newman v. Conover, 313 F. Supp. 623, 62526 (N.D. Tex. 1970)

(three-judge court); State
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This is the narrowest possible interpretation of Stanley.
Much broader constructions of the Stan-2

ley case also have staunch adherents.9

v. Scott, 460 S.W.2d 103, 111 (Tex. 1970);
Gornto v. State, 178 S.E.2d 894, 896 (Ga. 1970).
Accord, Report of Comm'r Charles H. Keating,
Jr. [hereinafter MINORITY REPORT], in THE
REPORT

OF

THE

COMM'N

ON

OBSCENITY

AND

PORNOGRAPHY 683-84 (N.Y. Times ed. 1970)
[hereinafter MAJORITY REPORT].
The Commission's Legal Panel interpreted the
summary affirmance differently:
The affirmance by the Supreme Court of
the Gable case, without oral argument and
without written opinion, would not appear to
settle existing questions about the reach of the
Stanley case. The Supreme Court sometimes
utilizes such summary affirmances as the
equivalent of a denial of certiorari-i.e., a refusal to exercise jurisdiction to review the case
on its merits.
MAJORITY REPORT 436 n.66.
92 United States v. Dellapia, 433 F.2d 1252 (2d
Cir. 1970); Williams v. District of Columbia, 419
F.2d 638 (D.C. Cir. 1969); United States v.
Hayes V. Van Hoomissen, [unreported] (D. Ore.
1970); 119 Cartons Containing 30,000 Obscene
Magazines, 321 F. Supp. 642 (C.D. Cal. 1970);
Reichenberger v. Conrad, 319 F. Supp. 1240
(W.D. Wis. 1970); United States v. B&H Dist.
Corp., 319 F. Supp. 1231 (W.D. Wis. 1970);
United States v. Articles of "Obscene" Merchandise, 315 F. Supp. 191 (S.D.N.Y. 1970) (threejudge court); United States v. Langford, 315
F. Supp. 472 (D. Minn. 1970); United States v.
Lethe, 312 F. Supp. 421 (E.D. Cal. 1970);
United States v. Thirty-Seven (37) Photographs,
309 F. Supp. 36 (C.D. Cal.) (three-judge court)
prob. juris. noted, 400 U.S. 817 (1970); Karalexis
v. Byrne, 306 F. Supp. 1363 (D. Mass. 1969),
(three-judge court) (one judge dissenting) rev'd
on another ground, 397 U.S. 1061 (1970); Stein
v. Batchelor, 300 F. Supp. 602 (N.D. Tex. 1969),
rev'd on another ground sub nor. Dyson v.
Stein, 397 U.S. 982 (1970); United States v. One
(1) Carton Containing: 35 MM Film, 50 F.R.D.
34, 36 n.4 (S.D.N.Y. 1970); United States v.
Reidel, unreported (C.D. Cal.), prob. juris. noted,
400 U.S. 817 (1970); City of Youngstown v. De

Commentators have pronounced dead
93
Roth's two-level theory of expression
and suggested that "obscenity is protected
speech subject only to regulation in the
interest of protecting the unwilling and the
young. ' 94 The Majority Report of the
President's Commission on Obscenity and
Pornography concurred:
The logic of Stanley may thus require the
holding that at least some distributions of
obscene material to consenting adults may

no longer be constitutionally prohibited unless legislation is supported by reasonably
apprehended social harms. 95

This thinking holds that the "clear and
present danger" test should be applied to
dissemination of obscene matter, in the
face of the statement in Stanley that such
was not necessary in cases involving public
distribution of obscene material. 96
Soon after Stanley was decided, a threejudge court held, in Stein v. Batchelor,9 7
that a Texas obscenity statute was unconstitutionally broad, on the ground that
obscene matter lacks constitutional protection "only in the context of 'public actions taken or intended to be taken with
respect to obscene matter'. ' 98 Fascinated
by Stanley's "broader implications" allegedly rejecting the two-level theory pro-

Loreto, 19 Ohio App. 2d 267, 251 N.E.2d 491
(1969).
93 Engdahl, supra note 73, at 201; Karre, supra,
note 73, at 650.
94 Katz, supra note 73, at 210.
95 MAJORITY REPORT, supra note 73, at 426.
96 394 U.S. at 567.
9 7 300 F. Supp. 602 (N.D. Tex. 1969), rev'd on
another ground sub nom. Dyson v. Stein, 397

U.S. 982 (1970).
98 Id. at 606, quoting 394 U.S. at 561.

17
mulgated in Roth, 0 this court offered the
following observation:
... Stanley may reasonably be read as supporting the proposition that obscenity is
fully protected by the First Amendment,
but that the State has a legitimate interest
in regulating the public dissemination of
ideas inimical to the public morality.' 00

This proposition implies that obscenity
must be regulated under the tests normally
applied under the first amendment, under
which regulation is valid only insofar as is
necessary to serve more important governmental interests.
This thought is embraced in both Reichenberger v. Conrad1° ' and Williams v. District of Columbia.1 2 In Reichenberger, a
district court asserted that prohibition of
obscene performances must be restricted
to situations wherein such performance is
available to children or is imposed upon
unwilling adults. 10 3 Similarly, in Williams,
a court of appeals read into a statute punishing the use of obscene language in any
public place the requirement that such
words be spoken in circumstances threatening breach of peace. 0 4 The failure of the
Stanley Court to delineate the scope of
public distribution of obscene matter still
regulable under the Roth case prompted
these decisions.
Perhaps the leading broad interpretation
of Stanley is that offered in Karalexis v.

99 Id.
1oo Id. at n.3.
101 319 F. Supp. 1240 (W.D. Wis. 1970).
102 419 F.2d 638 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
103
104

319 F. Supp. at 1242.
419 F.2d at 645-46.
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Byrne.'0 5 Therein, a three-judge court, one
judge dissenting, viewed Stanley as limiting
Roth to "public distribution in the full
sense" and accepting "restricted distribution, adequately controlled." 106 The majority judges, disturbed by the apparent
meaninglessness of a right to receive a
communication without a corresponding
right to communicate and concerned with
the limited opportunity of the less affluent,
reasoned as follows:
It is difficult to think that if Stanley has a
constitutional right to view obscene films,
the Court would intend its exercise to be
only at the expense of a criminal act on
behalf of the only logical source, the professional supplier. A constitutional right to
receive a communication would seem meaningless if there were no coextensive right to
make it. .

. If a rich Stanley can view a

film, or read a book, in his home, a poorer
Stanley should be free to visit a protected
theatre or library. We see no reason for
10 7
saying he must go alone.
A preliminary injunction permitting exhibition of I Am Curious (Yellow), a motion
picture assumed to be obscene, 0 8s was
granted, on condition that the plaintiff continue to indicate the possible offensiveness
of the film, refrain from pandering, and re-

105 306 F. Supp. 1363 (D. Mass. 1969)

(three-

judge court) (one judge dissenting), rev'd on
another ground, 397 U.S. 1061 (1971); Note,
Obscenity from Stanley to Karalexis: A Back
Door Approach to First Amendment Protection,
23 VAND. L. REV. 369 (1970). See Recent Decision, ALBANY L. REV. 708 (1970).
106 Id. at 1366.
107 Id. at 1366-67.
108 The movie has since been held obscene.
Grove Press, Inc. v. Maryland Bd. of Censors,
255 Md. 297, 258 A.2d 240 (1970), aIJ'd by an
equally divided court, -U.S.(1971) (mem.).
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fuse admission to minors.' 0 9 Stanley was
interpreted as holding that obscenity constitutes no "clear and present danger" to an
adult, since proscription of its private possession in the home would be constitutional
if the Court believed obscene matter is
harmful per se. 1 0 Accordingly, the court
concluded that it was probable that the invoked state statute,"' which prohibited the
commercial distribution of obscene matter
without regard to the manner of distribu12
tion, was constitutionally overbroad.
Similar charges of constitutional overbreadth have been successful in several
prosecutions under federal obscenity stat113
utes. In United States v. Lethe, a district
court concluded that the federal statute
prohibiting mailing obscene matter is unconstitutional as applied to sending such
materials through the mails to a requesting
adult."

4

If the government has no substantial interest in preventing a citizen from reading
[obscene] books and watching [obscene]
films in the privacy of his home, then
clearly it can have no greater interest in
preventing him from acquiring them. The
only possible purpose in preventing him
from acquiring them is to prevent him from
enjoying them. 115

109 306 F. Supp. at 1368.
110 Id. at 1366.
111 MASS. GEN. LAWS

ANN.

ch. 272 § 28A (Supp.

"[U]nless the government can demonstrate
it has some substantial interest in preventing the sale other than keeping the
purchaser from buying,""" the court reasoned, "[t]he distributor must . . . be
allowed to provide what the person is entitled to see."" ' 7
In United States v. Dellapia,11s the
Second Circuit advanced the same analysis
in its attempt to determine the scope of
constitutional protection granted to obscenity by the Stanley Court. The Second
Circuit concluded that consenting adults
may share their private collections of obscene material and reversed a conviction,
under section 1461, for use of the mails in
furtherance of this form of mutual enjoyment. 119 The court rejected protecting an
adult from his personal moral views (if
they did not harm others) as a legitimate
governmental interest, stating that the Constitution guarantees to "every adult . . .
the freedom to nurture or neglect his moral
and intellectual growth. '' 12 The privacy
protected in Stanley was read to encompass
private communication.
A Wisconsin district court concurred in
this interpretation in United States v. B&H
Distribution Corp.'2 ' This court read the
Stanley case as recognizing only two legitimate governmental interests in regulation
of obscenity, i.e., protection of children and
of unwilling adults, and concluded that "the
test of constitutionality to be applied since

1970).
112 306 F. Supp. at 1367.
312 F. Supp. 421 (E.D. Cal. 1970); accord,
United States v. Reidel, unreported (C.D. Cal.),
prob. juris. noted, 400 U.S. 817 (1970); United
113

States v. Langford, 315 F. Supp. 472 (D. Minn.
1970).
114 Id. at 426

(1964)).
115 Id. at 424.

(construing 18 U.S.C. § 1461

116

Id.

117 Id. at 425.
118 433 F.2d 1252 (2d Cir. 1970).

119 Id. at 1258.
120 Id.
121 319 F. Supp. 1231 (W.D. Wis. 1970).

17
Stanley must be the test of whether the
proscribed uses or conduct are in conflict
with either of the two permissible governmental goals."'1 22 Action not inconsistent
with these goals enjoys first amendment
protection, for the court defines public conduct involving obscene matter as action in
conflict with these two constitutional interests. 123 The application of section 1462,
prohibiting interstate transportation of obscene matter, was held invalid, because the
matter in question was not transported so
as to influence children or violate the sensibilities of unwilling adults, and because
the nation or the state cannot frustrate indirectly the individual's right to use obscene
matter by outlawing transmission of the
124
requisite materials to him.
Like-minded courts have invalidated applications of section 1305 of title 19,125
which bans importation of any obscene
matter. Positing that the right to possess
such material implies the collateral right to
import it, a three-judge court, in United
States v. Thirty-Seven (37) Photographs,120 decided that the statute contravenes
the
first
and
fourteenth
amendments because "[i]t prohibits a
person who may constitutionally view [obscene] pictures . . . the right to receive

122

Id. at 1234.

123

Id.
Id. at 1235-37.

124
125

19 U.S.C. § 1305 (1964).

126

309 F. Supp. 36 (C.D. Cal.) (three-judge

court), prob. juris. noted, 400 U.S. 817 (1970);
accord, United States v. 119 Cartons Containing

30,000 Obscene Magazines, unreported (C.D.
Cal. 1970); City of Youngstown v. De Loreto,
19 Ohio App. 2d 267, 288, 251 N.E.2d 491, 505

(1969). See United States v. One (1) Carton
Containing: 35 MM Film, 50 F.R.D. 34, 36 n.4
(S.D.N.Y. 1970).
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them. '127 Another three-judge court concurred in United States v. Articles of "Obscene" Merchandise.128 This court read
Stanley as
attribut[ing] to Roth a traditional First
Amendment rationale to assure its validity
while withdrawing from the theory of an
absolute exception for obscenity so clearly
discerned in the First Amendment by the
129
majority in Roth.
It saw a return to "straightforward First
Amendment theory," under which regulation is restricted to protection of children
and prevention of obtrusion, 130 and deemed
unconstitutional section 1305, so far as it
prohibits importation of obscene matter
for private use.131 The Stanley Court's
statement that the right to receive matter,
regardless of social value, is basic 132 was
considered a complete repudiation of the
two-level theory espoused by the Roth
Court.
The Supreme Court's extension of first
amendment protection to private possession of obscene matter has raised important
constitutional questions regarding regulation of the dissemination of obscene matter.
The decisive issue is this: is obscenity
constitutionally protected expression, subject to regulation only in the interest of
more important governmental goals, i.e.,
protection of children and prevention of
obtrusion, or is it generally regulable, ex-

127 309 F. Supp. at 38.
128 315 F. Supp. 191 (S.D.N.Y. 1970) (threejudge court).
129 Id. at 195.
130 Id; accord, Hayse v. Van Hoomissen, 321
F. Supp. 642 (D. Ore. 1970).
131 Id. at 196.
132 394 U.S. at 564.
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cept in special circumstances, e.g., private
possession in the home? The Stanley opinion can be read to support either view.
Therein, the Court clearly declared that the
Roth doctrine remained unimpaired in
cases involving public dissemination of obscene material, but failed to define the
scope of public dissemination. Instead, the
Court stressed the importance both of
privacy and of the right to receive. This
permitted those courts called upon to
apply Stanley either to strictly limit its protection of obscene matter to the private
context, or to broaden its holding, on the
ground that the right to private possession
is negated without similar recognition of a
corresponding right to provide. Consequently, confusion is the present state of
the law regarding obscenity.
Scope of Constitutional Protection of
Obscene Expression Under the
"Clear and Present Danger" Test
If the Supreme Court decides to extend
constitutional protection to obscene expression in all contexts, then the government
must show important interests to justify
restriction of that protection. Five considerations have been proposed to support
prohibition of dissemination of obscene
matter: (1) prevention of crime; (2)
preservation of the public morality; (3)
facilitation of law enforcement; (4) protection of children; and (5) prevention of
obtrusion. The Stanley Court accepted considerations (4) and (5)'1 and rejected
considerations (2)134 and (3)2 3 5 Since

protection of children and prevention of
obtrusion do not require and, therefore,
cannot be the basis for a blanket prohibition on the dissemination of obscene material,'13 6 the Court would be called upon to
determine whether consideration (1)prevention of crime-is adequate reason
for such prohibition. This possibility
prompts brief analysis of the alleged relationship between obscenity and antisocial
behavior.
The Roth case was decided in 1957,
when the general belief was that there is
a causal relationship between obscenity
and crime. In 1954, Dr. Fredric Wertham
concluded that obscene materials were an
important factor in the causation of violence, delinquency, and sexual maladjustment in children. . 37 Two years later, a
United States Senate Subcommittee found
that "[t]he impulses which spur people to
sex crimes unquestionably are intensified
by reading and seeing pornographic materials." 138 J. Edgar Hoover, Director of the
Federal Bureau of Investigation, testified,
in 1959, that
we do know ... that in an overwhelmingly

136 The argument that the government can justify
restriction of distribution to adults as necessary
to insure protection of children is foreclosed by
Butler v. Michigan, 352 U.S. 380, 383 (1957),
which stated that "reduc[ing] the adult population
. . . to reading only what is fit for children"
would be "to burn the house to roast the pig."
Accord, Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 195

(1964). The same type of constitutional overbreadth would invalidate laws prohibiting all

manners of dissemination in order to prevent
obtrusive distribution.
137

133
134
35

Id. at 567.
Id. at 566.
Id. at 567-68.

F.

WERTHAM,

SEDUCTION OF THE INNOCENT

(1954).
138 S. REP. No. 2381, 84th Cong., 2d Sess. at 62

(1956).

17
large number of cases sex crime is associated with pornography. We know that sex
criminals read it,
are clearly influenced by
it. I believe pornography is a major cause
of sex violence. 139

There was opinion to the contrary, 140 but
the above quotations reflect generally the
atmosphere in which the Roth decision
was made.
The view of the effects of obscenity was
revised in the light of subsequent research

during the 1960's. As the decade opened,
James Kilpatrick, a staunch defender of
prohibition of obscene material, announced
that a causal relationship between obscenity and antisocial behavior could not be
proved statistically, although "the common
sense of mankind, supported by the opinions of experts, holds strongly that such a
relationship exists," but recognized no need
to justify obscenity laws with "evidence of
immediate and direct incitement to overt
acts-evidence of readers who lay down
their dirty books and rush to the streets for

a night of satyriasis." 141 In 1962, a lawyer
and two behavioral scientists reported that
there was no transitional link showing that
arousal from exposure to obscene material
affects overt behavior.14 2 Condemnations of
the alleged effects of obscenity were issued

139 Quoted in J. KILPATRICK, THE SMUT PED238 (1960); see Hoover, Combating Merchants of Filth: The Role of tile FBI, 25 U. PITT.
L. REV. 469 (1964).
140 See United States v. Roth, 237 F.2d 796, 801
et seq. (2d Cir. 1956) (Frank, J., concurring),
afl'd, 354 U.S. 476 (1957).
141 J.KILPATRICK, supra note 139, at 234 (italics
omitted).
142 Cairns, Paul & Wishner, Sex Censorship: The
Assumptions of Anti-Obscenity Laws and the
Empirical Evidence, 46 MINN. L. REV. 1009, 1034
(1962).
DLERS
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periodically, 14 3 but the need for proof of
a causal connection between it and antisocial conduct was growing. In 1964, the
theory that obscenity prevents crimes of
144
sexual violence was seriously advanced.
The following year, the Institute for Sex
Research reported that the only inference
to be drawn from a strong response to
obscenity is imaginativeness, sensitivity,
and projection ability in people who so react.1 45 Most recently, the majority of the
President's Commission on Obscenity and
Pornography concluded that indulgence in
obscenity neither corrupts people's characters nor significantly contributes to antisocial behavior or crime. 146 Thus, the pre-

143: E.g., R. KYLE-KEITH, THE HIGH PRICE OF

PORNOGRAPHY 52-69 (1961); T. MURPHY, CENSORSHIP:

GOVERNMENTAL

OBSCENITY

131-51

(1963); C. ROLPH, DOES PORNOGRAPHY MATTER?
(1961); Blount, Pornography and Its Effect on
Society, 44 FLA. B.J. 518 (1970); Levine, Sexual
Sensationalism and the First Amendment: The
Supreme Court's Questionable Regime of Obscenity Adjudication, 42 N.Y.S.B.J. 193, 308 (1970).
See H.

CLOR, OBSCENITY

AND

PUBLIC MORAL-

ITY: CENSORSHIP IN A LIBERAL SOCIETY 136-74
(1969); Rogge,"[T]he High Court of Obscenity"
I1, 41 U. COLO. L. REV. 201, 220-29 (1969);
Finnis, "Reason and Passion"; The Constitutional
Dialectic of Free Speech and Obscenity, 116 U.
PA. L. REV. 222 (1967).
144 Murphy, The Value of Pornography, 10
WAYNE L. REV. 655, 661 (1964); see Falk, The
Roth Decision in the Light of Sociological Knowledge, 54 A.B.A.J. 288, 290 (1968).
145 p.

GEBHARD

et al., SEX OFFENDERS:

AN

ANALYSIS OF TYPES 403-04 (1965).
146 MAJORITY REPORT, supra note 91, at 256-

57. The Majority Report also stated that causal
connection had not been absolutely disproved.
Id. at 286. In Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S.
629, 641-43 (1968), the Court concludedthough only with regard to obscenity's alleged
effect on children-that it was not "irrational"
for the legislature to find a causal connection,
and therefore upheld the state statute then chal-
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vailing expert opinion is different from
that at the time of the Roth case.
It seems probable that the Supreme
Court would decide that this possible
danger from obscene matter is insufficient under the "clear and present danger"
test to justify prohibition of controlled
dissemination. The Stanley Court, which
weighed this factor against the interest in
private consumption, noted the paucity of
evidence supporting the proposition that
experiencing obscenity prompts deviant
sexual practices or crimes. 147 The Court
could conclude that this argument is sufficient justification for prohibition of public
dissemination under the "clear and present
danger" test, but this writer believes such
an expectation is wishful thinking.
Conclusion
The probability is that the Supreme
Court will uphold controlled commercial14 8 distribution of obscene matter if
it rejects the Roth doctrine's absolute exclusion from constitutional protection of
public dissemination of obscene expression.

lenged. Hence, the Majority Report's admission
that the alleged connection is not disproved may
provide a basis for upholding prohibition of commercial distribution.
147 394 U.S. at 566. The Court cited Cairns et
al., supra note 142 and M. JAHODA, THE IMPACT
OF LITERATURE: A PSYCHOLOGICAL DISCUSSION
OF SOME ASSUMPTIONS

IN THE CENSORSHIP DE-

(1954), summarized in United States v.
Roth, 237 F.2d 796, 814-16 (2d Cir. 1956)
(Frank J., concurring), aff'd, 354 U.S. 476
BATE

(1957).
148 Commercialism per se is not a ground for
regulation. Ginzburg v. United States, 383 U.S.
463, 474 (1966); New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 265-66 (1964); Smith v.
California, 361 U.S. 147, 150 (1959).

However, the Court will not so reject the
Roth case in the near future. The absence
of conclusive proof that obscenity creates
a "clear and present danger" of antisocial
behavior, which would otherwise be required to justify an absolute ban on its
dissemination, will prompt the Court not
to further restrict the Roth doctrine's rejection of the need to show "clear and present danger." While the fervent belief that
obscenity is a source of corruption that
must be eliminated 149 remains in the public
mind, the Court will be reluctant to embrace the obtrusive obscenity concept.
Obscene expression was brought from
beyond the pale of the first amendment in
the Stanley case. This action has required
courts to consider the question whether
Stanley "is . ..the high water mark of a
past flood, or ...the precursor of a new
one."150 These courts have construed this

landmark decision contradictorily, thereby
necessitating clarification from the Supreme

"Communities believe, and act on the belief,
that obscenity is immoral, is wrong for the
individual, and has no place in a decent society.
They believe, too, that adults as well as children are corruptible in morals and character,
and that obscenity is a source of corruption
that should be eliminated. Obscenity is not
suppressed primarily for the protection of
others. Much of it is suppressed for the purity
of the community and for the salvation and
welfare of the 'consumer.' Obscenity, at bottom, is not crime. Obscenity is sin."

149

Henkin, Morals and the Constitution: The Sin of
Obscenity, 63 COLUM. L. REV. 391, 395 (1963).

150 "The only valid purpose of obscenity law is
to prevent public offense." PACKER, THE LIMITS
OF THE CRIMINAL SANCTION 324 (1968), Karalexis v. Byrne, 306 F. Supp. 1363, 1366 (D.
Mass. 1969) (three-judge court) (one judge dissenting), rev'd on another ground, 397 U.S. 1061
(1970).
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Court. 151 There are but two predictables
regarding what will happen when the Court
finally takes the question of the scope of
constitutional protection to be afforded to
obscene expression: (1) protection of children and of the privacy of unwilling adults
will be held to outweigh any interest in its
unrestricted dissemination; 152 and (2) the

151 "Stanley was one of those few occasions
when a per curiam reversal without opinion
would have been most welcome." Katz, supra
note 73, at 217.
152 The Court unanimously upheld the federal
statute (81 Stat. 645, 39 U.S.C. § 4009 (1964
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decision will not be unanimous., 3 As a
result, controlled distribution, i.e., distribution which will not endanger children or
invade the privacy of others, may eventually gain legal protection, but obscenity is
not yet an "idea" whose time has come.

ed. Supp. IV)) permitting the individual to insulate himself from mailed advertisements that
he finds "erotically arousing or sexually provocative." Rowan v. United States Post Office Dep't,
397 U.S. 728, 730 (1970).
153 "When ruling on obscenity, state and federal appellate benches do not split, they splinter."
R. KuHr, FOOLISH FIGLEAVES? PORNOGRAPHY INAND OUT OF-COURT 215 (1967).

